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 Flexible price contract linked to the future spot price of  commodity is formulated. 
 Manufacturer and retailer can be win-win under flexible price contract. 
 Flexible price contract with financial hedging is formulated to mitigate the risk-averse 
retailer‟s exposure to commodity price risk. 
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We consider a two-stage supply chain comprising one risk-neutral manufacturer (he) and 
one risk-averse retailer (she), where the manufacturer procures consumption commodities in 
spot market as major inputs for production and sells the final products to the retailer. The 
retailer then sells the final products to the market at a stochastic clearance price.  We 
investigate a flexible price contract that allows the manufacturer to determine the product 
wholesale price, and the retailer to determine the order quantity, based on the future spot 
price of consumption commodities.  Compared with the simple wholesale price contract, a 
win-win situation can be achieved under the flexible price contract when the manufacturer‟s 
postponed processing cost is lower than a threshold.  However, under this flexible price 
contract the retailer may suffer from the commodity price volatility, even if she does not 
procure the commodities directly.  We further investigate how the risk-averse retailer 
conducts mean-variance financial hedging by purchasing consumption commodity futures 














closed-form time-consistent financial hedging policy.  Through numerical experiments, we 
show that the commodity price risk from the manufacturer to the retailer is effectively 
mitigated with the hedging, and the benefits of the flexible price contract are maintained.   
Keywords: Risk management, pricing, mean-variance, demand forecast update, contracts  
1 Introduction 
Consumption commodities, by definition, refer to those highly standardized materials that 
are held mainly for consumption (Hull, 2009).  Metals, energies, and agricultural products 
are the most common consumption commodities that are used extensively in various 
industries (Wang et al. 2014). These consumption commodities are commonly traded in 
standardized spot markets, thanks to the standardization of trading contracts and the 
development of electronic trading platforms.  However, the spot prices of these commodities 
have shown substantial fluctuation in the past decades (Li et al. 2017, Tong et al. 2017). 
Under today‟s volatile business environment, it is not uncommon that the price of various 
commodities can greatly vary, sometimes by more than 50 percent in a short period of time 
(Brown, 2008).  For commodity-based supply chains, the growing price volatility has been 
one of the primary challenges for the supply chain members (Wang et al. 2017, Wang et al. 
2016). Especially, consider the common phenomena that a lead-time exists between the 
signing of the supply contract and the physical production of the product, due to 
transportation, production set-up, inter alia.  This lead-time can take as long as several 
months, during which the spot price could undergo significant changes.  Therefore, the 
traditional wholesale price contract might not work well under the environment with 
stochastic commodity prices.  
       This paper explores how the supply chain members can benefit from incorporating the 
commodity markets (spot and futures markets) in the design of supply contracts based on the 
wholesale price contract, which probably is the most widely used contract in practice. Under 
the traditional wholesale price contract, the transfer payment between the supply chain 
parties is fixed before the production activity takes place.  For instance, the wholesale price 
may be set based on the commodity spot price on the date when the contract is signed.  
However, the spot price could hike when the manufacturer procures the commodities for 














if the current commodity price is significantly lower than the contract price committed 
earlier.  To address this issue, this study attempts to investigate a form of supply contract 
signed between the manufacturer and the retailer, and that the wholesale price of the 
products is based on the spot price of the commodities on future date, e.g., when the physical 
transaction takes place. 
       Indeed, this form of supply contract has been adopted by practitioners, who are exposed 
to significant uncertainty of raw materials‟ cost, to actively manage the price fluctuation 
(Feng et al., 2013).  For instance, it is reported that flexible price contract contingent on the 
input commodity price has been found useful in utility industry to deal with the uncertainty 
cost of fuel, such as oil, coal, and natural gas (Charles, 2005). As for the medical device 
manufacturing industry, precious metal could contribute up to 90% of the manufacturing 
cost (e.g., medical wire).  Considering the significant volatility of the precious metal price, 
the finished product is usually invoiced to the small and medium-sized buyer depending on 
the market price of the metal on the delivery date rather than the price on the date when the 
contract is signed (Bestrom, 2009).  From these examples, it can be seen that such a contract 
is signed early but the realized product wholesale price is based on the spot price of the 
commodities when physical transaction takes place. This type of supply contract is known as 
flexible price contract.  Despite its proven value in practice, flexible price contract is still 
under-studied by researchers.  Such contracts can be further explored to see how they could 
be applied to bring greater benefit to members in a supply chain.   
     Motivated by the practice mentioned above, this paper conducts a thorough research on 
flexible price contract under which the upstream and downstream supply chain parties agree 
on a transfer payment contingent on the future spot market price of the input commodities.  
In particular, we are interested in the following research questions.  First, is it a win-win 
solution for both supply chain parties to sign such a flexible price contract?  Second, how 
the supply chain performance in terms of production output and competition penalty would 
be affected under this contract? 
      To answer these questions, we will compare the effects of two different supply contracts 
on a supply chain as well as on its members individually.  The first is a flexible price 














contract without flexibility (referred to as S-contract).  This study will be conducted based 
on a stylized model where a risk-neutral manufacturer (he), acting as the leader, proposes a 
„take-it-or-leave-it‟ offer (regarding the product wholesale price) to a risk-averse retailer 
(she).  If the retailer accepts the offer, she will decide on how many units to order.  Also, a 
mean-variance criterion is adopted to characterize the retailer‟s risk attitude.  The proposed 
supply chain model is considered appropriate for industries involving consumption 
commodities (Zhao et al. 2015).  In such industry, compared with the downstream retailers, 
the upstream manufacturers usually require huge amount of capital for the procurement of 
input commodities and investment on the production technology.  As Chod and Lyandres 
(2011) and Zhao et al. (2015) discuss, it is reasonable to consider such kind of supply chain 
to be composed of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer.  Also, such kind of 
assumption is popular in the operations management literature. For instance, Gan et al. 
(2004), Xiao and Yang (2009), Chiu et al. (2011), Li et al. (2014), Jiang et al. (2016), and Li 
et al.(2016) all consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-neural manufacturer (or supplier) 
and a risk-averse retailer. 
       In practice, many risk-averse firms have employed financial instruments such as 
commodity futures and options to reduce the risk exposure incurred by financial random 
factors such as fluctuating commodity price and uncertain foreign exchange rates. See, for 
example, a recent empirical study by Bartram et al. (2009).  However, most of the current 
studies investigate the problem from the perspective of the direct commodity buyer while 
ignoring the potential impact on the downstream firms, which may suffer from the 
uncertainties transferred from the upstream commodity buyers. In practice, it is not 
uncommon that these uncertainties could propagate along the supply chain.  For instance, 
under the aforementioned flexible supply contract, the ordering quantities and transfer 
payments are influenced by the commodity spot price fluctuation.  To address this issue, we 
further raise the following question, (3) how could the financial derivatives (such as futures 
or options) on the input commodity be effectively incorporated in the design of the flexible 
price contract?  
     To answer the foregoing research question, this research further investigates a form of 














compute the equilibrium solutions and the corresponding profits/payoffs of the supply chain 
parties, and then compare the F-contract and S-contract both analytically and numerically.  
Our goal is to examine the effectiveness of flexible price contracts and identify the 
conditions under which the supply chain parties should select S-contract, F-contract or H-
contract.  Also, we will show how the time-consistent financial hedging strategy embedded 
in the H-contract can be derived analytically.  Some managerial insights are obtained on 
supply chains that have consumption commodities as the main inputs.   The main findings 
are summarized as follows: 
 The flexible price contract contingent on the future spot price of the input commodity 
helps to achieve mutual benefits for the manufacturer and the retailer, when the 
manufacturer‟s postponed processing cost is lower than a threshold. 
 The risk exposure of the retailer can be effectively reduced by adopting the time-
consistent financial hedging policy. 
 Financial hedging can be incorporated without affecting the manufacturer‟s 
operational decisions.  
      The remainder of the paper is as follows.  The related literature is reviewed in Section 2.  
The model settings and notations are presented in Section 3.  The equilibrium results under 
the F-contract and the comparison between the F-contract and the S-contract are given in 
Section 4.  The equilibrium solutions under the H-contract are derived in Section 5.  
Numerical study is conducted in Section 6 to show the effectiveness of the H-contract.  
Concluding remarks and directions for further research are presented in Section 7.  All the 
proofs are given in the online appendix. 
2 Literature Review 
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate how the commodity markets can be 
fruitfully used in the design of supply contracts. Specifically, our study is related to three 
streams of literature: (i) supply chain management in the presence of spot market, (ii) 
procurement management with financial hedging, and (iii) ordering decision making with 














    Early work in the first stream has been critically reviewed by Haksöz and Seshadri (2007).  
In recent years, several studies have investigated the benefits of incorporating spot market 
into supply chain operations and planning.  For example, Chen et al. (2013) characterize the 
structural ordering policy for a firm procuring components from a spot market and a supplier 
with a minimum-order commitment.  From the perspective of a commodity reseller, Xing et 
al. (2012) investigate how the buyer‟s procurement and pricing strategies are affected by a 
B2B spot market.  Xing et al. (2014) further explore the strategic role of spot market in a 
two-stage supply chain, and find that spot market is not solely a second channel for 
procurement.  Ma et al. (2015) study a firm‟s advance-booking decisions by assuming a firm 
can procure from the spot market as well as by using long-term contracts.  To sum up, we 
find that most existing studies along this stream consider the spot market as a sourcing 
channel and/or a selling channel.  Their focus is on the supply chain parties‟ performance 
when the spot market is introduced.  Different from these studies, this paper investigates 
how spot market could be fruitfully used to design the flexible supply contract signed 
between a manufacturer and a retailer. We examine the efficacy of such a contract and 
derive the conditions under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can both benefit 
from such a contractual agreement.   
      We note that the flexible price contract we studied in this paper could also be called 
contingent contract in a general sense, which is extensively studied in the literature.  For 
instance, Bazerman and Gillespie (1999) demonstrate the benefits of contingent contracts in 
various settings.  We, however, identify the conditions under which such benefits can be 
realized and propose a feasible contract that could be employed in a supply chain in the 
presence of commodity markets.  In addition, we recognize that the flexible price contract 
might also be referred to as pass-through contract in practice (Matthews 2011), which has 
rarely received attention in the literature (Wu et al. 2013).  Zhang et al. (2013) and Bolandiar 
and Chen (2015) studied an index-linked/based contract, which is actually similar to the 
pass-through contract and hence similar to our flexible price contract.  Specifically, 
Bolandiar and Chen (2015) consider a risk-neutral commodity-based supply chain with two 
competitive commodity processors and one common retailer.  They show that the processors 
do not prefer to fully pass the commodity price risks to the downstream retailer.   Differently, 














certain conditions both the commodity processor and the retailer could be benefited by 
letting the downstream retailer fully bear the commodity price risks.  
     Our work also contributes to the growing literature on procurement management with 
financial hedging.  In particular, our work is related to the studies on hedging under the 
mean-variance criterion.  It has been observed that mean-variance framework is commonly 
adopted in the operations management literature.  Chiu and Choi (2016) conduct a 
comprehensive review of literature applying a mean-variance evaluation framework to 
analyze supply chain risks.  For studies involving financial hedging, commodity price risk 
mitigation using financial instrument has gained attention from the perspective of commodity 
buyers.  See, e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993), Neuberger (1999), Gaur and 
Seshadri (2005), Ni et al. (2012, 2016), and Kouvelis et al. (2013).  However, few 
researchers have considered the problem from the perspective of the other supply chain 
parties and/or the entire supply chain, with the possible exception of Caldentey and Haugh 
(2009) and Turcic et al. (2015).  In particular, Caldentey and Haugh (2009) examine the 
efficacy of flexible and wholesale price contracts in a risk-neutral supply chain where the 
retailer is budget-constrained and the supply chain‟s profit is correlated to some general 
economic indices. Turcic et al. (2015) consider a decentralized risk-neutral supply chain in 
which financial hedging is employed to avoid possible default.  We also notice that financial 
market could be simply used as a means for the physical acquisition of the commodity.  For 
example, Ni et al. (2015) consider a two-echelon supply chain where the downstream 
manufacturer procures an intermediate product through a bilateral contract with the upstream 
supplier and a futures market.  Different from their works, we model the retailer‟s risk-
averse attitude and consider the impact of demand forecast update.  In our research, the 
rationale for trading financial derivatives is to reduce the risk-averse retailer‟s exposures, 
while Caldentey and Haugh (2009) aim at relaxing the risk-neutral retailer‟s budget 
constraint. 
      Lastly, our research is related to the studies on ordering decisions with demand forecast 
update.  Choi (2007) investigates the pre-season inventory decisions and product pricing 
decisions with multiple information updates.  Choi and Sethi (2010) review literature on 














the demand forecast and production/distribution schedules.  Ma et al. (2012) consider a loss-
averse newsvendor ordering problem with demand information update.  Shang et al. (2015) 
investigate the incentive of a retailer to share the updated demand information in a supply 
chain with two competing manufacturers that sell substitutive products through a common 
retailer.  Zhao et al. (2015) investigate demand information updating, demand-spot-price 
correlation, and their impacts on the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Some other 
typical studies on information update include Iyer and Bergen (1997), Gurnani, and Tang 
(1999), Donohue (2000), and Yang et al. (2011).  
3 Model Formulation 
3.1 Model settings and notations 
Table 1 Summary of mathematical notations 
Symbols Parameters 
   Commodity spot market price at time   
   Wholesale price at time   
   Ordering quantity at time   
   Commodity processing cost at time   
  Fixed markup charged by the manufacturer 
  The random market size 
   Market size forecast in period    
   Demand forecast adjustments during period         
   Cumulative demand forecast adjustment up to period   
  Demand elasticity 
  The degree of risk aversion 
            
Filtration that is generated by           and           on a given 
probability space         
   Price of the futures contract at time   maturing at time   
   Quantity of futures contracts held at time   
   Retailer‟s wealth level at time   
   Short-term deviation in prices  
   Long-term equilibrium price level 














   Short-term volatility 
   Short-term risk premium 
   Long-term volatility 
  
  Equilibrium risk-neutral drift rate 
  Correlation in increments 
 
In the proposed model, the contract terms are determined at time   while the market clearing 
price and the resulting cash flow are realized at a future time    .  Between time 0 and T, 
the manufacturer processes the commodities into products at a time  , i.e.,       .  As 
we have mentioned, the risk-neutral manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader and proposes 
a unit wholesale price    for the products; and this price depends on the commodity spot 
market price at time   (we denote this price as   ).  Also, the risk-averse retailer determines 
the ordering quantity   .  The manufacturer‟s unit cost is composed of a commodity 
processing cost (denoted as   ) and a commodity procurement cost.  As the products should 
be delivered to the retailer on or before time  , it is clear that the production response time 
decreases in the value of  .  As it is generally costly to delay production, without loss of 
generality, we assume that    is strictly positive when   takes a positive value and    is zero 
when    .  The commodity procurement cost denotes the cost to acquire the input 
commodity from the spot market.   
      Manufacturer’s problem. We assume that the wholesale price is a linear function of the 
spot price of the input commodity, i.e.,        , where  denotes the fixed markup 
pre-determined by the manufacturer.  This kind of transfer payment is widely used in 
existing literature, e.g., Li and Kouvelis (1999).  Then the manufacturer‟s expected payoff is 
given by 
                                                                   (1) 
where       denotes the cost to provide    units of products to the retailer. 
      Retailer’s problem. Following Caldentey and Haugh (2009), we adopt the stochastic 
linear clearance price model to compute the retailer‟s revenue.  Given the retailer‟s ordering 














      is the price at which the retailer sells (clears) the products she have. The random 
variable   represents the market size and the fixed parameter   captures demand elasticity.  
The retailer‟s payoff under the mean-variance criterion then takes the following form 
         
 
 
        ,                                            (2) 
where   is a positive constant representing risk aversion, and    is the retailer‟s random 
profit, i.e.,                  . 
       We assume that the demand information can be updated over the planning horizon      .  
For example, the supply chain parties can perform a market research to collect information 
about demand.  The forecast of the market size   is based on the assumption that the market 
evolves following the additive martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE), see Wang et 
al. (2012).  The time interval       is divided into   periods and the interval from   to   is 
regarded as the      -th period.  The market size forecast in period          is given 
by              , where    is the expected market size in period 1 and    
represents forecast adjustments during period        .  The adjustments are assumed to 
be independent with each other and normally distributed with mean zero and variance   
 .  
           is used to represent the cumulative forecast adjustment up to period  .  
Then, the estimate of   after observing    is normally distributed with parameters     
   ∑   
    
      .  Throughout this paper, we assume that there is no information asymmetry 
between the retailer and the manufacturer.   
      It is clear that    and    depend on the spot price of the underlying commodity at time  .  
Also,    and    depend on the spot price of the commodity at time   because both of them 
are functions of    and   .  The risk-averse retailer may then have incentive to trade in the 
financial market during the time interval       to mitigate the revenue volatility.  In contrast, 
the risk-neutral manufacturer has no incentive to trade in the financial market, given the 
perfect capital market assumption (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).   
 














We assume that there exists a futures contract written on the spot price of the same 
commodity used for production.  In particular, we assume that the contract perfectly matches 
the planning horizon i.e.,      , which is a standard assumption in the hedging literature (see 
e.g., Ni et al. (2012), Kouvelis et al. (2013), Turcic et al. (2015), Goel and Tanrisever (2017), 
and Ni et al. (2017))
1
.     is used to denote the price of the futures contract at time   
maturing at time  .  Filtration             is generated by           and           on a 
given probability space        .  In this model,   is assumed to be a combination of the 
real-world probability measure on demands and the risk-neutral measure on spot prices.  
Following the literature, we assume that           and           are independent. This 
implies that the real-world and risk-neutral measures of the demand distribution are 
equivalent because the demand risk is completely diversifiable (Berling and Rosling, 2005; 
Goel and Tanrisever, 2011).  In this setting, the discounted futures contract prices are then 
 -           .  We also assume that there is a risk-free cash account available for 
depositing cash.  Without loss of generality, the risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero.  
Therefore,    is a  -          .  The use of risk-neutral probability measure ensures that 
trading in the futures market is for hedging only and any other speculation for financial gains 
is ruled out.  This is consistent with how the financial markets are used by nonfinancial firms 
in practice.   
      Let    denote the quantity of futures contracts held at time  .        represents the gain 
(or loss) at time   that results from following a   -predictable self-financing trading strategy, 
            .  See Shreve (2004) for details about the property of self-financing.  Because 
the risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero, the gain at time   takes the following form in 
the discrete time trading setting: 
      ∑            
   
   
                                                 
                                                          
1
 We would like to thank the anonymous referee for comment on this.  Specifically, if the maturity date of the 
futures contract mismatches with the planning horizon, basis risk would arise.  Readers may refer to Castelino 
(1992) for the effect of basis risk on the hedging effectiveness.  Following the literature on the interface of 
operations management and finance, research on the effect of basis risk on hedging is out of the scope of this 














In addition, a complete financial market is assumed for simplifying the analysis (Smith and 
Nau, 1995).   
 
3.3 Three supply contracts 
We investigate three contractual agreements between the manufacturer and the retailer.  As 
stated earlier, the contract is signed at time 0 whereas the actual physical transaction takes 
place at time    .  
1) Supply contract without flexibility (S-contract) 
Under this simple wholesale price contract,    , i.e., the product wholesale price and 
ordering quantity are both based on the commodity price at the beginning of the planning 
horizon.  The model is then reduced to the case where the commodity spot market is used as 
the source to purchase raw materials.  
2) Flexible price contract (F-contract) 
Under the flexible price contract, the physical transaction takes place at time          
while the contract is signed at time 0.  It is obvious that S-contract is a special case of F-
contract with    .  Under the F-contract, the manufacturer offers an   -measurable 
wholesale price,        , to the retailer.  Given this, the retailer determines an   -
measurable ordering quantity,         , which should be interpreted as the retailer‟s 
response to    rather than a function of   .  In this case, besides serving as a sourcing 
channel to purchase raw materials, the commodity spot market provides an index that is used 
to determine the wholesale price. 
3) Flexible price contract with financial hedging (H-contract) 
This contract is similar to F-contract except that the risk-averse retailer now has access to the 
financial market to hedge her uncertain payoff.  In particular, the retailer can trade in the 
futures market and dynamically rebalance the positions of the futures contracts over time 














     To simplify the exposition, in the ensuing analysis the superscripts S, F, and H are used to 
index the results obtained under the S-contract, F-contract, and H-contract, respectively.  As 
the simple contract is a special case of the flexible supply contract, we study F-contract in 
the following section.  
4 Flexible Price Contract 
4.1 Supply chain parties’ performance  
In response to the wholesale price,   , the risk-averse retailer determines the ordering 
quantity,         , by solving the following optimization problem: 
    
         
    
   
      
 
 
    
                                              
where                  .  Note that   
     and     
     represent the expectation 
and variance taken under the probability measure   conditional on   , respectively.  For 
notational convenience, let us define  ̅    
    .  Specially, we let  ̅    
    .  Notice that 
the choice of the risk neutral probability measure with respect to the uncertain demand is not 
unique because the market is not complete (the uncertain demand is not a random factor that 
can be fully hedged in the financial market in the proposed model), though the financial 
market itself is complete; see Ni et al. (2016) for a technical discussion. Thus, without loss 
of generality, one can choose the real-world probability measure as the   - measure with 
respect to the demand uncertainty.  
      Let   
  denote the optimal response of the retailer under the F-contract given a wholesale 
price   .  Given the retailer‟s optimal response, the manufacturer then obtains the optimal 
wholesale price by solving: 
  
    
 
[   
     
     
      
   ]                                                 
     In this paper, the objective of the retailer is to maximize the cash flow under a mean-
variance criterion while the manufacturer‟s objective is to maximize the expected cash flow.  
Note that the expectation and variance involved throughout this paper are all taken under the 














equivalent martingale measure (EMM) and the expected payoff of any financial hedge 
would be zero.  Following Caldentey and Haugh (2009), we simply assume that there exists 
such an EMM without concerning how it should be identified.  Although this is a standard 
assumption in the literature (e.g., Chod et al. 2010, Goel and Gutierrez 2011, Chod and Zhou 
2014), we notice that the financial risk exposed to the firms is actually discounted under the 
risk-neutral measure.  However, we note that our model considers both financial risk 
(stochastic commodity price) and nonfinancial risk (uncertain demand), which means that 
the market is incomplete and the discounting for risk cannot be fully addressed with the risk-
neutral measure.  Thus, in an incomplete market, it is still necessary to use a utility function 
to model the retailer‟s risk-averse behavior (Ni et al. 2016).  Alternatively, it would also be 
interesting to investigate the case where real-world probability measure is employed on both 
the demand uncertainty and spot prices (Kouvelis et al. 2013).  We leave it for future study 
due to the technical complexity. 
     Notice that the condition of production postponement written in the F-contract allows the 
manufacturer to procure in the forward market rather than relying solely on the spot market.  
However, the risk-neutral manufacturer cannot gain any benefit through procuring in the 
forward market under the perfect capital market condition (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  
Therefore, all the input commodities will be procured in the spot market only.  In other 
words, the input commodity is procured at the prevailing price   .  As stated earlier, 
compared with the S-contract case, an additional commodity processing cost,   , is incurred 
due to the reduction in the production lead time.  Therefore, we have                .  
The following proposition shows the equilibrium results for the manufacturer and the retailer. 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium wholesale price and ordering quantity for the F-contract are: 
  
  
 ̅       
 
 and   
  
 ̅       
         
                                              (6) 
The corresponding expected payoffs of the manufacturer and of the retailer are: 
    
  
  ̅        
 
         














    
  
  ̅        
 
          
                                                                  
     From the above proposition, we observe that the retailer‟s payoff under the mean-
variance criterion is proportional to the manufacturer‟s expected profit. This makes their 
profits aligned and predictable.  We further conduct sensitive analysis with respect to the 
risk-aversion parameter   and find that the supply chain parties‟ profits are reduced if the 
retailer‟s degree of risk aversion is high.  The main factor is found to be the ordering 
quantity, which is decreasing in  . 
      We now compare the equilibrium outcomes for the F-contract when     and the 
results for the S-contract when    .  As the following proposition shows, it is not a 
straightforward comparison because the production cost changes in a complicated way, 
especially when the transaction is postponed by the retailer to wait for more updated demand 
information.   
Proposition 2:  
1.  For the equilibrium wholesale price, we have   
    




2.  As for the equilibrium ordering quantity and the manufacturer‟s expected payoff, we 
have the following comparison results depending on the relationship between    and 
 ̅     √  , where    
 ∑   
  
   
    ∑   
    
   
  ̅      and    
        
 
    ∑   
    
   
  ̅     
  
∑   
  
        
     .   
             2.1)  If     , we have   
 
     
     
 .  As for the ordering quantity, if      , 
then   
    
     ;  otherwise,   
    
     . 
              2.2)  If     , the comparison results are as follows. 
                    Case 1:     ̅     √  . 
1) If      ̅     √  , then   
 
   
      and   
 
     
     
 . 
2) If  ̅     √        , then   
    
      but   
      
     
 . 
3) If      , then   
 
   
      and   
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Case 2:     ̅     √  .  
1) If      , then   
    
      and   
      
     
 . 
2) If        ̅     √  , then   
 
   
      but   
 
     
     
 . 
3) If     ̅     √  , then   
    
      and   
 [    
 ]    
 . 
     From Proposition 2, three major observations can be made.  Firstly, the expected optimal 
ordering quantity under F-contract is larger than that under S-contract, when the 
manufacturer‟s postponed processing cost is lower than a threshold (     ).  Notice that    
is increasing in the reduced variability of the market size.  Therefore, given   , the retailer 
has more opportunities to order more under F-contract when the information updating 
procedure is effective, i.e., the demand forecast is more accurate.  Otherwise, the retailer is 
expected to order less under F-contract.   
      Secondly, we compare the manufacturer‟s expected payoff (the retailer‟s expected payoff 
is proportional to the manufacturer‟s) and find that, if the reduced demand variability is large, 
i.e. when    is negative, then the manufacturer will earn more under F-contract.  When the 
reduced demand variability is moderate such that      and     ̅     √  , the 
manufacturer and the retailer are also better off under F-contract.  However, if the reduced 
demand variability is low such that      and     ̅     √  , then the manufacturer 
and the retailer will be worse off under F-contract.  In short, a win-win situation can be 
achieved under F-contract only if the manufacturer‟s postponed processing cost is lower than 
a threshold,  ̅     √  . 
     Thirdly, the expected profit of the manufacturer and the expected ordering quantity 
placed by the retailer under F-contract both decrease in the commodity processing cost.  
When the cost is sufficiently high, F-contract will be dominated by S-contract.  However, the 
conditions under which these two values fall below that under S-contract are different.  This 
result suggests that the ordering quantity does not play a critical role in the supply chain 
parties‟ profit gains.  Instead, the profit margin, which is defined as the wholesale price 
subtracting the commodity processing cost, is the major factor affecting their payoffs.  In 
Case 1, the condition     ̅     √   is satisfied while in Case 2 the condition     ̅  














given as follows.   For Case 1,                        ; for Case 2,        
               . The remaining parameters are the same as those in the base case in 
Section 6.  As we can see from Figure 1, the profit margin decreases more sharply than the 
ordering quantity does in both cases.  
 
 
Figure 1: Profit margin and ordering quantity under F-contract  
4.2 Supply chain’s performance  
We next investigate the supply chain‟s performance.  The optimal ordering quantity and the 
corresponding profit of the centralized supply chain can be obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem  
    
     
    
  
                                                                       
The optimal ordering quantity and the corresponding system profit are, respectively 
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      Immediately, we have     
    
  if a)     , or b)      and     ̅     √  .  The 
proof of the above result is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.  





    
 
                                                                         
  
    
    
      
 
    
 
                                                  
     The first ratio is used to measure the ineffectiveness of the decentralized solution from 
the aspect of production output (Caldentey and Haugh, 2009).  The second ratio is similar to 
the competition penalty in Cachon and Zipkin (1999).  However, here the expected utility of 
the retailer is adopted due to her risk-aversion.  Similarly, the overall effectiveness of F-
contract is high when   
  is small.  The following proposition characterizes the two ratios in 
terms of the risk-aversion parameter  . 
Proposition 3:  
(1)   
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     Proposition 3 is immediate from the definition of the ratios and the optimal solutions we 
have obtained.  From Proposition 3, two observations can be made.  Firstly, the efficiency of 
the F-contract and S-contract decreases as the retailer becomes more risk averse.  Secondly, 
F-contract is more effective than S-contract with respect to both production output and 
competition penalty.  The result holds irrespective of the degree of risk aversion of the 
retailer. 
      Although F-contract will lead to higher payoff for both the manufacturer and the retailer 
under certain conditions, it will also increase the variability of the retailer‟s profit due to the 
latter‟s exposure to the commodity price fluctuation.  Fortunately, such kind of financial risk 
can be controlled using financial instruments such as the commodity futures contract written 














been observed that it is not uncommon for nonfinancial firms to reduce their risk exposures 
by using financial derivatives (Bartram et al., 2009).  Intuitively, the volatility in the 
retailer‟s profit incurred by the volatile commodity price could be partially mitigated by 
engaging in commodity futures markets.  Therefore, the next section will focus on how a 
commodity futures contract could interplay with the design of flexible supply contract.   
 
5. Flexible Price Contract with Financial Hedging  
For simplicity, we assume that there exists a futures contract written on the spot price of 
input commodity maturing exactly on time  .     is used to denote the price of futures 
contracts at time  , which matures at time  .     represents the position of the futures 
contracts held by the retailer at time   (a long position is represented as     ).  The time 
horizon       is divided into   stages, depending on the frequency of rebalancing desired by 
the retailer (Ni et al., 2012).  Note that in this model,         .  The uncertain payoff of 
the retailer at time   including the profit earned (or loss incurred) by dynamically trading in 
the futures market takes the form of 
    
     ∑            
   
   
                                                 
where                  . 
       In response to the wholesale price,   , the risk-averse retailer determines the ordering 
quantity,         , by solving the following optimization problem: 
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Given the initial wealth level  , the retailer‟s wealth level at time   can be formulated as: 
                     ,                             (15) 
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      Following the approach developed in Basak and Chabakauri (2010, 2012), the following 
proposition provides a time-consistent policy.  The proof in the Appendix illustrates how 
such a policy can be derived. 
Proposition 4: Given the spot price   , the retailer‟s optimal ordering quantity is   
    
  
 ̅       
         
  and the manufacturer‟s optimal wholesale price is   
    
  
 ̅       
 
.  At the 
last stage, the optimal position in futures contracts held for hedging is given as follows: 
    
   
      
       
  
      
     
                                                       
where   
        
    
    
   
  
        For          the optimal position in the futures contracts can be represented as: 
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From Proposition 4, three observations can be made.  Firstly, it is observed that the 
optimal wholesale price and ordering quantity in this case is the same as those in the F-
contract case.  This implies that the manufacturer is not affected by the retailer‟s financial 
hedging behavior.  In other words, financial hedging will not incur additional complexity to 
the manufacturer‟s operational decision making, which is desirable from practical interests.  
Secondly, the retailer should conduct long hedge, i.e., buy futures contracts, as the value of 
the optimal positions is negative.  This is because the hedgeable risk for the retailer is the 
payment that she is going to transfer to the manufacturer.  Also, these results are largely due 
to the assumption that the manufacturer is risk neutral and that financial trading is employed 
to hedge the uncertain payoff of the retailer without any speculative purpose.  Thirdly, 
although it is well-known that mean-variance criterion is not time consistent, we can see that 
the derived optimal hedging policy is time-consistent in the sense that the optimal decisions 
in the future are also optimal now.  In other words, the derived policy is not static or myopic 














to Basak and Chabakauri (2010, 2012) for a more detailed discussion about time-consistent 
policy under the mean-variance framework.   
5.1 Price modeling of commodity futures 
In order to implement the financial hedging policy proposed in Proposition 4, the short-
term/long-term model of Schwartz and Smith (2000) is employed to price the futures 
contracts.  However, it is worth noting that the financial hedging policy as well as the other 
results previously obtained do not depend on any specific commodity price model.  
Following Schwartz and Smith (2000), the natural logarithm of the spot price at time   is 
defined as             , where    denotes the short-term factor and    denotes the 
long-term factor.  Under the risk-neutral valuation framework, the processes of the two-
factor model are of the form: 
    (       )        
                                            
                   
                                               
where    
  and    
  are increments of standard Brownian motion under the risk-neutral 
probability measure with    
    
     .  The price of the futures contracts written on 
the spot price of the commodity is: 
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      That is, at the beginning of the planning horizon, the possible trend of the futures price 
can be estimated based on the initial price information.  As time progresses, new 
observations on the prices of the commodities are obtained.  Based on the updated 
information on commodity prices, the estimation of possible futures price trend can be 
improved.  The following lemma gives the information process of stochastic price.  These 
results are required for deriving the exact expression of the optimal position of futures 
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Based on Lemma 1, the expression of the optimal hedging position can be written as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 5: At the beginning of stage  , the optimal amount of futures contract to hold 
during this stage can be represented as:  
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     Proposition 5 provides the optimal hedge positions in the futures contract in closed-form 
expressions.  From the expressions, we can see that the hedge quantity can be decomposed 
into two components which corresponds to the demand uncertainty and the commodity price 
fluctuation respectively.   
     
6. Numerical Studies 
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the benefits of H-contract 
and compare the performance of different supply contracts.  We consider a planning horizon 


























  and 
time  .   
      The uncertainty of the market size is assumed to be reduced linearly over time, i.e., 
  
            
 , where         
  
 
          , and    is the initial variance of 
the market size.  The residual uncertainty is given by   
         
 .  Under this additive 
MMFE model, the forecast essentially evolves following a Brownian motion.    
      In the base model, we assume that the initial estimated demand,   , is 2.5 and the 
uncertainty,  , is    .  Without loss of generality, we divide the prices of the commodity and 
the corresponding futures contract by 100000.  By doing so, we can make sure that the 
ordering quantity under the clearance price model is non-negative with the value of demand 
and cost being a small number.  Another interpretation for this is that we could consider the 
units of demand and the processing cost should be multiplied by 100000.   In addition, 
without loss of generality,    is set to zero to make sure that the comparison between F-
contract and H-contract is conducted under the situation that F-contract dominates S-contract. 
      The parameters of the stochastic commodity process are estimated following the 
approach introduced in Schwartz and Smith (2000).  The dataset consists of weekly 
observations of prices for the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) copper futures contracts 
maturing in the next month and in approximately 3, 5, 7, and 10 months.  The data is 
collected from 02/26/2010 to 04/12/2013, with 163 weekly observations in total.  Table 2 
shows the maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the commodity price process based 
on this dataset. 
Table 2 Summary of stochastic price process parameters (copper) 
Parameters Symbols Value (standard deviation) 
Short-term mean-reversion rate   0.2410 (0.0541) 
Short-term volatility    0.2392 (0.0558) 
Short-term risk premium    -0.2750 (0.1501) 
Long-term volatility    0.3901 (0.0268) 
Equilibrium risk-neutral drift rate   
  -0.0515 (0.1060) 














Initial condition   
Short-term factor    0.9555 
Long-term factor    10.0363 
 Spot price    59382 
     We first compare the performance of F-contract and S-contract.  The following figure 
shows the performance with respective to   , the unit commodity processing cost at time  .  
Note that Case 1 and Case 2 corresponds to the two cases in Proposition 2. 
 
Figure 2: Performance comparison between F-contract and S-contract 
     In Figure 2, the value of X Axis denotes the commodity processing cost and the value of 
Y Axis denotes the performance improvement of F-contract compared with S-contract, 
which is defined as 
    
    
  
.  Therefore, positive value means that F-contract dominates S-
contract while negative value means that S-contract performs better than the F-contract.  
Note that we use the manufacturer‟s profit only because the results of Proposition 1 show 
that the retailer‟s payoff is proportional to the manufacturer‟s expected profit.  From Figure 
2, we can see that F-contract dominates S-contract when     the commodity processing cost, 
is no larger than a threshold value.  Specially, the threshold value in Case 1 is 0.6 while the 
threshold value in Case 2 is 0.05, which are calculated according to the expression given in 
Proposition 2.  In addition, we can see that in both cases the advantage of the flexibility 














approaches to zero.  However, the advantage of F-contract will disappear and S-contract will 
outperform as the commodity processing cost increases.  Therefore, the supply chain 
members should evaluate the operational parameters carefully before deciding whether F-
contract should be adopted. 
      Next, we compare the performance of H-contract and F-contract.  To do so, three 
different measures are employed with respect to the retailer‟s profits obtained by adopting 
these two contracts.  The results are summarized in Table 3.  Before we explain the results in 
details, we would like to illustrate a bit more how the results are calculated so that better 
understanding on the implementation of H-contract and F-contract could be achieved.  As 
we generate 5000 samples using the Monte Carlo simulation, we will use the data in the first 
sample for illustration.  At time 0, the manufacturer first announces the wholesale price and 
then the retailer decides the ordering quantity.  Both of them depend on the future spot price 
and the demand information at the end of the 9th week (the planning horizon is 12 weeks in 
total), which are given by Equation (6).  At the end of the 9th week, the spot price and 
demand information are updated, according to Equation (6) the realized wholesale price and 
ordering quantity are 1.6309 and 0.3419, respectively. These are the decisions the supply 
chain members need to make under F-contract.  For the H-contract, the decisions for the 
wholesale price and ordering quantity are the same as those under F-contract.  But the 
retailer will engage in financial hedging at time 0.  Using the data generated in the first 
sample, the initial quantity of futures contract that the retailer should buy is 0.2113, which is 
calculated using Equation (24).  According to the setting, the retailer will review her hedging 
position every   days (We assume that there are 5 trading days per week and the hedging 
horizon (9 weeks) is divided into 5 stages).  According to Proposition 5, the quantities of 
futures contract that the retailer holds in the remaining 4 stages are 0.2099, 0.2007, 0.2035, 
and 0.2187, respectively.  At the end of the hedging horizon, i.e., the end of the 9th week, 
the retailer will close the hedging position with cash transaction and the realized profit from 
hedging is 0.0164. At the same time, the retailer orders 0.3419 from the manufacturer at the 
wholesale price 1.6309.  The manufacturer‟s profit is 0.3545 and the retailer‟s hedged payoff 
under mean-variance criterion is 0.2268.     
 














 SD VaR (5%) CVaR (5%) 
H-Contract 0.0137 0.1869 0.1819 
F-Contract 0.0181 0.1796 0.1725 
        Table 3 shows that H-contract outperforms F-contract with respect to all three measures: 
the standard deviation (SD), the value-at-risk (VaR) and the conditional value-at-risk 
(CVaR).  As we can see, the SD of the retailer‟s profit is reduced from 0.0181 to 0.0137 by 
employing the proposed financial hedging policy.  Also, the downside risk measured by VaR 
and CVaR also increase by 4.1% and 5.4%, respectively.  This means that the worst case is 
improved by applying H-contract.  As CVaR can measure the risk beyond VaR, in the 
ensuing analysis CVaR will be applied as the major measure of the downside risk. 
6.1 Sensitivity analysis of the changing demand variance 
Following Ni et al. (2012), this analysis is conducted by increasing or decreasing the demand 
variance by using a changing ratio, i.e., 
                                      
      In particular, the changing ratio takes value from the ranges from -80% to 80%.  The 
performance of the H-contract is shown in the following figure. 
 














        It is observed from Figure 3 that the performance of the contracts is affected by the 
demand variance.  H-contract will be more powerful when the demand variance decreases as 
the gap between the CVaR under H-contract and F-contract widens slightly.  However, the 
financial hedging policy is still effective when the demand becomes more volatile since the 
CVaR under H-contract is strictly larger than that under F-contract.   
6.2 Sensitivity analysis of changing transaction time 













  and 
  
  
.  The performance of the H-contract is shown in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 4 Performance of F-contract and H-contract with changing transaction time 
     It is observed from Figure 4 that the performance of the contracts will be affected by the 
transaction time.  H-contract will be more powerful when the transaction time delays even 
more as the gap between the CVaR under H-contract and F-contract widens slightly.  
However, the financial hedging policy is still effective with relatively short postponement of 














6.3 Comparison between multi-stage hedging policy and one-stage hedging policy 
In the implementation of H-contract, a multi-stage hedging policy is employed.  However, 
one-stage hedge could also be adopted to mitigate the commodity price risks.  In contrast to 
multi-stage hedge, one-stage hedge does not require rebalancing of the futures position over 
the planning horizon.  The performances of the two hedging policies are evaluated in this 
section.  
      H-contract with one-stage hedge also aims to optimize the same utility function as the 
multi-stage hedge case.  In such a case, the futures position is not rebalanced during the 
planning horizon.  The calculation is similar to the procedure of deriving the multi-stage 
hedging policy in H-contract.  Therefore, the process is omitted here.  Under this framework, 
the optimal futures position is given by: 
   
   
    
       
  
    
     
                                                               
    In the following, Monte Carlo simulation is conducted to compare the performance of the 
multi-stage policy and one-stage policy with respect to CVaR, which is the major measure of 
downside risk.  Specifically, 5000 samples of the stochastic spot and futures prices and the 
demand information are generated based on the parameters we set at the beginning of this 
section.  The results are shown in the following three figures. 
 















Figure 6 Performance of multi-stage and one-stage hedging with changing transaction time 
 
Figure 7 Performance of multi-stage and one-stage hedging with changing price volatility 
     As can be seen in Figures 5 to 7, the CVaR under H-contract with multi-stage hedge is 














more powerful in commodity price risk hedging than the latter.  Also, H-contract with one-
stage hedge significantly outperforms F-contract, in which no hedge is employed, as the gap 
between the CVaR under H-contract with one-stage hedge and F-contract is quite wide.  
Figure 5 shows that H-contract with multi-stage hedge outperforms the H-contract with one-
stage hedge when the demand becomes more uncertain.  Meanwhile, financial hedging 
becomes less powerful as the gap between the hedged and unhedged CVaR decreases.  
Figure 6 shows that the H-contract with multi-stage hedge is more powerful in risk hedging 
than the H-contract with one-stage hedge when the transaction time has a larger delay.  
Meanwhile, financial hedging becomes more powerful as the gap between the hedged and 
unhedged CVaR increases.  Figure 7 shows that the performance of the H-contract with 
multi-stage hedge is not affected significantly when the price volatility varies within the 
range of -50% to 50%.  However, the H-contract with one-stage hedge becomes less 
effective when the price becomes more volatile.   
 
7. Conclusion Remarks 
This paper considers a form of “flexible supply contract”, which is widely used in supply 
chains with consumption commodities as the main inputs.  Specifically, we consider the 
management of input commodity price fluctuation in a supply chain context in which the 
upstream manufacturer procures commodities from the spot market.  We also investigate the 
value of demand forecast update during the lead time between contract signing and the 
manufacturer‟s at-once production of the products.  Our analysis shows that, for both the 
manufacturer and the retailer, flexible supply contract (F-contract) outperforms the 
traditional simple wholesale price contract (S-contract) when the manufacturer‟s postponed 
processing cost is lower than a threshold.  That is, a win-win situation can be achieved under 
F-contract.  
      It is worth noting that, although F-contract can lead to higher payoff for both players, the 
commodity price volatility is also transmitted to the downstream risk-averse retailer who 
does not face such variability under the traditional wholesale price contract.  In order to 














which commodity futures contracts are traded dynamically.  The numerical study shows that 
the risk-averse retailer‟s performance can be improved with hedging, with three major risk 
measures serving as metrics.  Lastly, a comparative study is conducted between H-contract 
with multi-stage hedge and that with one-stage hedge.  We observe that H-contract with 
multi-stage hedge is more powerful in commodity price risk hedging. 
      There are three possible directions along which this research can be extended.  In this 
paper, the commodity price risks are born either by the upstream manufacturer through S-
contract or the downstream retailer through F-contract or H-contract. Thus, a potentially 
useful extension is to consider a risk-sharing mechanism between the manufacturer and the 
retailer.  However, it might be challenging to derive the strategy as the optimal strategy 
might then be a combination of both risk-sharing and risk-hedging.  The second extension is 
to consider a supply chain where both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk averse.  It is 
expected that model solvability would be a big problem.  The last possible extension is to 
consider a “closed” input commodity spot market, in which powerful supplier(s) can 
determine the spot price by controlling the supply of the commodity in the spot market. In 
this case, it would be more appropriate to consider a three-stage supply chain in which the 
commodity supplier is explicitly considered.  We shall leave these issues for future research. 
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Appendix A: 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
     Given the wholesale price   , the retailer‟s optimal response is 
  
  
 ̅    
        
 
   
                                                                   (A1) 
Given the retailer‟s optimal response, the best wholesale price,   
 , can be obtained by 
solving the manufacturer‟s problem.  Substituting   
  and   
  into the payoff function of the 
manufacturer and the retailer, the equilibrium expected payoffs can be obtained.               □ 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
      Following the procedure in the F-contract case, the equilibrium optimal decisions under 
the S-contract can be readily obtained: 
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       Recall that the following conditional variances are known:     
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a)  As for the wholesale price, the comparison can be obtained immediately as follows: 
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b) We now compare the expected ordering quantity under the F-contract and the ordering 
quantity under the S-contract.  Following the results of Proposition 1, we have 
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From (A3), we can see that   
 
   
      if       where    
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Otherwise, we have   
    
     . 
c)  As the retailer‟s equilibrium expected payoff is proportional to the manufacturer‟s 
equilibrium expected payoff, the comparison will be conducted with respect to the 
manufacturer only.   Again from Proposition 1, we have 
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Before conducting the comparison, the following result is introduced for the proof. 
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The sign of expression (A4) is thus the same as the following expression 
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Let    
         
 
     ∑   
    
   
   ̅     
  ∑   
  
        
     . If      then immediately we 
have   
 [    
 ]    
  as      .  Otherwise, the relationship depends on the value of   .  
From expression (A6), the following results are straightforward.  If     ̅     √  , then 
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 . 
The proof can be finished by comparing the  ̅     √   with   .  The procedure is quite 
straightforward and thus is omitted.                                                                                               
□ 
Proof of Proposition 5:  
      First, let us define an auxiliary function      
      
 
 
    
     .  Following the law 
of total variance and the law of total expectation,    can be rewritten as  
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      Given the optimal time-consistent hedging policy    
     
   , the value function of the 
retailer can be defined as: 
     
    
   
 
 
    
    














where the terminal wealth  
  is calculated under the optimal trading policy    
     
    and the 
ordering quantity   
 .  From the recursive definition of    and the definition of     , the 
optimal trading policy,   
 , can be obtained by solving the following problem: 
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  .  The following recursive equation for   can be 
obtained 
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(A9) 
      It is clear that there exists a unique solution solving the above function.  The solution is: 
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     Specifically, when      ,            and     
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□ 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
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      Given the above results, the conditional variance of the spot price and futures price can 
be readily derived following the definition of variance.                                                                
□ 
      Proof of Proposition 6:   
Following lemma 8, the following results can be obtained as follows: 
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        Substituting the above results into Proposition 7, the proof can be completed.              □ 
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